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Immigration, Wages, and Growth in the Host Nations‡ 
Torben K. Mideksa§ 
Abstract 
This paper investigates the impact of skilled immigrants on the welfare the host natives. By 
employing the idea of induced technical change, and the skilled wage premium, this paper 
tries to link skilled immigration with observed rise in college enrolment, rise in skilled wages, 
and further acceleration of skilled wage premium. Through creation of demand for skill 
complimenting capital goods, skilled immigration raise the incentive for skill directed 
technical change which fuel up skilled wage in North, international wage differential, and the 
incentive for human capital formation. The results of the model are consistent with broad 
empirical regularities observed for three decades or more. 
 
JEL Code: J61; J31; J41; O32; O41 
Key Words: Skilled immigration; technical change; human capital; economic growth. 
I. Introduction 
International migration is an important phenomenon that affects the welfare of the sending 
and receiving countries. For a number of reasons, the economic performance of nations and 
respective factor payments differed very much across countries providing the incentive for 
people, goods, and resources to flow across countries. The magnitude of skilled workers’ 
flow, from south to the western countries, has been increasing and has grabbed the attention 
of economists1.  
 
Economists have been interested in the issue for a number of reasons2. Some of the reasons 
are: strict control of international labor flow could be inefficient and reduce welfare. 
Moreover, the fact that the free market requires free flow of workers and it is essential to 
understand the dynamics from efficiency grounds. Further more, concerns relating to small 
rate of growth in developing countries and the importance of human capital as engine of 
growth lead economists to analyse its causes and effect on economic development, and the 
incentive for skill formation in sending countries. Some economists have also suggested that 
skilled immigration could help ameliorating the expected problem related to aging population 
and the sustainability of the welfare system.   
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Most of developed countries have a strict immigration controls in order to satisfy a number of 
political and social objectives. The objectives are related to the impacts of immigration on the 
welfare of the receiving natives that also have been subject of discussion3. For instance, the 
immediate impact of high volume of immigrants is to decrease the wage in the labor market, 
to raise the price of various commodities, and compete for different social services such as 
public transport, education, and health services. This effect has been a justification for many 
voters and politicians alike to impose strict restrictions. However, such restrictions are costly 
since the short run effects of immigration do not remain permanently.  As firms adjust to the 
changes, wage increases due to increased demand for labor so as to meet the increased 
demand of consumption goods. As a result of demand induced rise in prices, producers also 
respond by expanding the outputs they produce over the long run to nullify the initial effect. 
 
Empirical works have been less fruitful due to their failure to identify the short run and the 
long run effect in addition to the usual problems of simultaneity and measurement error.  For 
instance, Borjas (2005) argued that excess skilled immigrants reduce the wage of skilled 
labor. However, the result has been challenged by Ottaviano and Peri (2006) and Peri (2006) 
who document the positive effect of immigrants on wage. 
  
Efficiency considerations, in addition to the impact on wage, have also been important. 
According to Rodrik (2001) the price wedge of similar goods across countries is about two 
times but the wage gap of similarly qualified workers across countries is 10 folds or more. “So 
the gains from liberalizing labor movements across countries are enormous, and much larger 
than the likely benefits from further liberalization in the traditional areas of goods and 
capital.”  The concern for efficiency has been largely neglected in international policy 
discussions due to the alleged negative impact of immigration on the natives; and, politicians 
in the north have little incentive to take short run painful measures that might possibly 
jeopardize their vote. 
 
Moreover, the outflow of skilled professionals has been recognised as detrimental to the 
growth of sending countries. Bhagwati and Hamada (1974) saw outflow as “negative 
externality” on those left in the sending country. Ndulu (2004) analyzes the pattern of the 
flow of skilled professional from Africa. Collier, Hoefler, and Pattillo (2004) study human 
and physical capital flight out of Africa in the framework of portfolio decision.  In line with 
standard theories of growth and development, many academicians and practitioners thought 
 3
that such outflow effectively reduces human capital and hence growth in the sending 
countries. However, recent research and evidence has resulted in some doubt on such theories.  
 
In addition to efficiency based and growth based reasons, economists have also been 
interested in the issue due to the incentives it creates for the accumulation of skill in the south.  
Various authors report the possibility of beneficiary brain drain and point out that it has a 
positive effect for source, through higher incentive for skill formation 4 . Prospects for 
migration raise the expected return of skill accumulation thereby raising the proportion of the 
population that accumulates skill. 
 
Concerns for public finance problem of the industrialized world lead Storesletten (2000) to 
use calibrated a general equilibrium model of overlapping generations to investigate the fiscal 
impact of skilled immigration. By giving due considerations for the differences of immigrants 
and natives ages and related characteristics, he argued that immigration of skilled 
professionals can sustain the fiscal policy problem associated with the baby boom generation. 
Storesletten (2003) also studied the effect of immigration on public finance accounts of 
Sweden. 
 
The aim of this paper is to relate the broad empirical regularities to understand the effect of 
skilled immigrants on wage premium, human capital formation, and economic growth of the 
host nation. There are some attempts to address the issue, though not exactly like this paper.  
Barro and Sala-i-martin( 2004) studied the impact of migration on per capita capital stock, 
speed of convergence, and economic growth using exogenous growth model while Kemnitz 
(2001) using the AK model. Lundborg and Segerstrom (2000) provide framework for 
international migration and economic growth within developed countries such as within the 
EU induced by trade and related policy distortions in a similar developed countries 
characterised by free migration policy but international trade barriers. This paper differs from 
Barro and Sala-i-martin( 2004) and Kemnitz (2001) as it focuses on deliberate technical 
change as engine of immigration. It also differs from Lundborg and Segerstrom (2000) in two 
important respects. First, this paper focuses on costly immigration decision. Second, their 
mechanism is trade and policy distortions while ours is directed technical change. Hence, 
throughout this paper, the emphasis is how directed technical change and wage premium 
affect skilled immigration and human capital formation and affected by skilled immigration 
which is totally absent in the literature. Further more, this paper provides integrated 
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framework to understand the impact of costly immigration on directed technical change, 
growth, wage premium, and human capital formation in the host nations. To the best my 
knowledge, the hypothesis linking deliberate technical change and the impact of immigration 
on wage premium, human capital formation, and technical change has not been analysed so 
far.  
 
This rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section two describes the broad empirical 
regularities related to immigration, wage premium, and human capital in the host nations. The 
research hypothesis and the mechanisms are also forwarded. Section three presents a simple 
framework to understand facts and the last section concludes. 
 
II. Facts 
This section presents the broad empirical patterns that have been observed during past 
decades. First I describe the share of immigrants in host nations and how strong impact they 
are likely to have. Next, I will briefly touch on the patterns of skill premiums which are 
observed in the literature followed by natives’ college enrolment. Then, an attempt is made to 
link the pattern of wage premiums with pattern of high skill accumulation and skilled 
immigration using time series data. 
 
Fact 1: Skilled immigrants account sizable fraction of the labor force of the host nations. 
Immigrants account large fraction of the labor force in many of the host countries. The share 
of foreign born individuals in the labor force of OECD country has been increasing since 
1950s and currently it is expected to be large. For instance, Lalonde and Topel (1997) 
reported that in Australia, it was only 10% of the population that was foreign born in 1950 but 
in 1980 the share increased to 22%. In 1980 alone, for instance the share of foreign born 
individuals in Canada and US is 16% and 7% respectively.  This is also the case in some 
European countries. For example the 45% of the labor force of Luxembourg is foreign 
workers5.  
 
According to Ndulu (2004), the share of immigrants is more than 20% of the labor force with 
both secondary and tertiary level of education in various OECD countries. As can also be seen 
from the table below, the educational profile of immigrants indicates that immigrants to 
Australia and Canada are more skilled than the natives on average compared to the US in 
1980. 
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Table 1: Educational Attainment of natives and immigrants in US, Canada, and Australia in 
19806 
 
 
The skill level immigrants and their country of origin vis-à-vis destination reported above 
have a pattern that has natural economic interpretation. The top, in terms of educational 
attainment, comes from continent of Africa, followed by Asia, Latin America, and Europe in 
all the three OECD countries of US, Australia, and Canada. Comparing the wage differential 
between the sending and the receiving countries, highest wage differential is observed in 
Africa, then Asia, followed by Latin America, and Europe which provides the strongest 
incentive according the wage differential. 
 
Fact 2: The skill premium has increased in western countries over the past three decades. 
Hecker (1992) presents evidence of the sharp rise in skilled wage premium in US beginning 
from 1997(see Figure 1 in the appendix). Fruitful explanation of this pattern has been given 
by Daron Acemoglu in a number of productive research such as Acemoglu (1998), Acemoglu 
(2002a), Acemoglu (2002b), Acemoglu (2003), and recently well formalized in Acemoglu 
(2007).  
 
Daron argues that technological progress is directed so that firms invent new technologies 
from which they are likely to obtain greater profit. Profits from new innovations are 
dependent on market size and prices. In the event where the market size effect dominates, 
innovators produce technologies that are biased towards the abundant factor, in this case 
skilled labor. As wage is proportional to technological progress, the wage of skilled workers 
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rises at a rate of biased technical progress which is greater than that of unskilled workers’ and 
directed technical change explains the patterns of skill premiums observed in the data. 
 
The greater gap between wage of skilled and less skilled workers has a number of 
implications. First and foremost, the wage differential between skilled workers at destination 
and host countries widens and skilled immigration is likely to accelerate following the rise in 
wage premiums in the host countries. Moreover, the proportion of natives who choose to 
accumulate skill increases as the return from accumulation of skill rises by greater rate 
compared to the return from not accumulating skill. 
 
Fact 3: The flow of skilled immigrants has increased over time and accelerated recently. 
Figure2 shows that skilled migration, from different continents to USA, has been increasing 
overtime and sharply accelerated since 1980s.  The variations in the intensity of migration can 
be explained by the affordable cost of mobility, which more or less proportional to per capita 
income of countries. For example, the reason for large numbers of migrants are from Latin 
America, mainly from Mexico, has to do with geographical proximity when compared with 
Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa. The Lowest intensity in Sub-Saharan Africa can also be 
accounted by the cost of mobility. 
 
The same pattern is also consistent with the data reported in table -1. Since the recent rise in 
skill premiums have been observed in most industrialized countries, the wage differential 
increased by largest in Africa, then Asia, and then in Latin America. The least increase in 
wage differential is likely to occur between Europe and USA and hence one can see the 
educational attainment pattern reported in the above table. 
 
 
Fact 4: Following skilled immigration, the proportion of people who accumulate skill has 
increased. Skilled immigration raises the skilled wage premium through induced technical 
change. Skilled wage premiums raises the returns to schooling as the simple model of 
schooling decision presented in section III implies that the proportion of individuals that 
accumulate skill increases. Recently, Murray (2007) reported that larger fraction of 
Americans are going to college7.  More informative picture is shown by Figure-3. The graph 
is drawn using data from US census in 20008. The data is also fitted using forth degree Spline. 
As can be observed from the fit, the proportion of high school graduates that choose to join 
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colleges and universities has sharply increased since 1979, the year at which the skilled wage 
premium has started to rise. See figure 3 for details. 
 
These four broad patterns lead to the hypothesis that factor abundance lead wage premium 
which in turn raises the demand for the abundant factor which further attracts that factor from 
anywhere. Skilled immigration to the western world has been increasing after the World War 
II and it sharply increased in 1980s. The same time, skilled wage premium, and the supply of 
skilled workers has also increased.   
 
The hypothesis of this paper is, therefore, the higher supply of skilled workers in US around 
1970s has biased the technological progress which in turn has raised the wage differential 
between skilled workers in USA and abroad. As a result of greater wage differential, rational 
individuals who managed to cover the cost of mobility responded by migrating to USA which 
in turn has created further incentive for technical change to be skilled biased and raise the 
wage of skilled workers. The final consequence would be higher incentive for skill 
accumulation due to higher skilled wage premiums, and greater growth due to the availability 
of more input and concomitant involvement in production of final goods and innovation. The 
schematic form of the hypothesis of this paper is:  
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The hypothesis linking the supply of skilled workers to biased technical change has been in 
the literature and this paper further adds the implication for immigration and its consequences. 
The next section presents an integrated framework to analyse the hypothesis using the idea of 
horizontal innovations of intermediate capital goods along the theory of rational immigration and skill 
formation.  
 
III. Simple Model 
In order to analyse the implication of skilled migration for wage premiums, human capital 
formation, growth, and evolution of income in the North, a simple framework is presented. 
First, I analyse the decision to migrate by skilled workers in south. Once migration decision is 
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analysed, I investigate its implication for the long term macroeconomic variables within the 
framework of horizontal innovation described in Romer (1991). 
 
Rational individuals make decision where to supply their labor service based on its net 
relative returns. Although, unlike goods and services, individuals have different preferences 
and costs for geographical mobility, basically goods and services, factors of production and 
labor follow the same fundamental economic principle, resources respond to incentives! Like 
any other factors of production, labor tends to flow to the areas where it obtains greater price 
for its services than otherwise. Thus, present values of income across different countries are 
among the key variable for individuals’ mobility decision. 
 
Focusing on skilled workers, it is assumed that workers face wage of )( SHw  if they remain at 
source country and )( NHw at destination country. Let us suppose that a given labor get more 
return in north than south. There is some evidence of skill premium that is an incentive for 
skilled workers to migrate. Rodrik (2001) pointed out that the international wage premium for 
equally qualified people is about 10 times or so. Easterly and Levine (2001) document that 
skilled wages premium is 24 times between US and India.  Such premium, for instance, could 
be due to property right problems as in Acemoglu, Robinson and Johnson (2001), variations 
in technical change as in Acemoglu and Zilibotti (2001), or lack of complimentary inputs as 
in Kremer (1993). Thus for a zero cost of travel, assuming that agent’s utility is linear in their 
income, agents choose to supply their labour in the North than in south.  
 
(1)   )()( NS HwHw <  
 
For variety of reasons described earlier, it is frequently observed that most destination 
countries impose some form of regulation to control the quantity and the quality of labor flow. 
Such regulations raise the cost of mobility. Moreover, spatial mobility involves other costs. 
Let the cost of mobility, M  has two components depending on the agents facing the cost. Let 
E  be the component that is constant across all agents, for instance it includes immigration 
laws in the host country, transportation cost, while )( iM l is a component associated with an 
individual “ i ” which depends up on il  which is a set of individual specific factors such as 
family background, preference to dislocate, marital status, cultural attachment, etc . Without 
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loss of generality, the paper assumes that )(~ ii f ll where )( if l  is any density function 
which has the standard properties of piecewise continuity, monotonicity, and boundedness 
with cumulative density function of )(•F . Thus the heterogeneity variable ranks cost of 
individuals in a systematic order. For illustrative simplicity, the domain is restricted 
to [ ]1,0∈l . Thus, the cost function is given by, 
 
 (2)  EMM i += )(l . 
 
The additional cost of individual heterogeneity factor is assumed to be positive, 0)(' >iM l  
and it satisfies ∞=→ )('lim1 iMi ll , 0)('lim0 =→ iMi ll  and let the inverse of )()(' •=• QM . These 
assumptions on the cost function ensure interior optimal solution. It is also assumed that any 
individual that affords to pay the cost M  can migrate to north without any additional 
requirement. 
 
Suppose that the total skilled labor in south is sH  and grows exogenously at a rate of v . This 
is not a bad assumption. As the decision to accumulate skill is analysed in section three, it can 
be seen that the agents that accumulate are fixed proportion of population which is more or 
less grows exogenously.  Individual skilled worker with il  decides to travel to north 
incurring cost if the present value of the sum of all future earnings in the north covers the 
present value of the sum of all earnings in south adjusted for the degree of diversion and cost 
of travel and vice versa.  
 
However, individuals also consider the risk associated with the return of their investment 
when deciding when to supply their service. Risks related to diversion of returns have been 
traditionally affected the decision to investment. Policy uncertainties might force risk avers 
agents to choose the optimal location under which they can reap the return of their 
investment. For instance, Rodrik (1991) presents a story where relatively minor fraction of 
policy uncertainty has unduly large impact on private investment. More recently, Collier, 
Hoeffler, & Pattillo (2004) presented evidence that uncertainties associated with the earnings 
at home countries forced skilled Africans to what they call the “African Exodus.” This effect 
is mainly related to institutional failures.  
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The institutional setup in many developing and transitional countries is characterised by 
weaker property rights. Consequently, radical and virulent form of institutions that share the 
profit of firms and wage of workers by creating and solving “problems” that government can 
not technically solve. In the nations where such agents have become stronger, they have 
managed to create grabber friendly institutions. For instance, local gangs receive a percentage 
of earnings of firms and residents to protect them from extortion by other gangs in many cities 
of developing countries. Skilled workers in many developing countries are also victims of 
such “problem solvers”. Without going into further details, let )1,0(1 ∈−θ  be the extent to 
which “parasites” in south can tax the return of skilled agents in south and assume that it is 
common for all skilled workers in the south9.  
 
Definition 1: Equilibrium with regard to mobility decision occurs when no one has incentive 
to migrate from south to north. 
  
At equilibrium, there is a critical value of the heterogeneous variable *il   with which a 
skilled labor in south with individual heterogeneous value below the critical level chooses to 
migrate while those with greater value decide to remain at home. It is found by equalizing the 
present value of earnings in the north less cost of travel to the effective present value of 
earnings in south. 
 
Proposition 2: A positive fraction of skilled professionals migrate to North at time “ t ”. 
Moreover, the proportion of skilled workers that emigrate from sending countries is 
increasing in earnings in the host countries and decreasing in θ  and earnings in the sending 
countries. 
 
Proof: 
The critical value *il  that satisfies the equilibrium condition is given by 
 
(3)  [ ] ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −−= ∫∞ − EdtHwHweQ sNrti
0
)()(* θl . 
 
The proportion of skilled workers that choose to migrate to the north is given by the 
cumulative distribution function evaluated at the critical threshold level. Thus, the total skilled 
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workers that migrate to north )(tHm , and skilled workers remaining in the source 
economy )(tH m−  is given by equations (4) and (5). 
 
(4)  )(*)(),( tHFtH Siim ll =    
 
Unlike the model by Kwok and Leland (1982) and Miyagiwa (1991), in this model 
immigrants are not necessarily very skilled compared to those remaining at home. Rather 
skilled immigrants have lower costs than the one who chosen to remain in the sending 
country. 
 
(5)  )(*))(1(),( tHFtH Siim ll −=− . 
 
Equation (3) provides consistent pro-intuitive interpretation. Greater earnings differentials or 
greater earnings in the north raises the proportion of people migrating since the total cost of 
mobility is decreasing in wage differential. On the other hand, larger discount rate, lower 
expropriation, and greater earnings in south decrease the proportion of labor that chooses 
migrating to the north. As it can also be seen from equation (4) the proportion of migrating 
workers is increasing in the critical threshold. Thus, lower wage differential and lower 
diversions at south raise the proportion of skilled workers remaining at home. 
 
(6)   0*)(),(
*
>= Siim
i
HftH
d
d lll  
 
At each time “ t ” firms in the north have )(tHm  of additional skilled labor flowing in to the 
labor market. This portion of labor may engage in the production of final goods or 
intermediaries that compliment labor in the production of final goods. QED 
 
Suppose that there are two categories of firms in the North. One set of firms produce final 
goods using skilled labor and intermediaries at competitive market taking the price of 
intermediaries and wage given. The other set of firms, which are individual monopolist, 
produce intermediate goods by buying patents from firms engaged in R&D.  
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At a given time, the total skilled supplied in the economy, where )(tH N  is skilled labor 
available in the north, is )(tH  which is given by the equation, 
 
(7)  
111
)()()(
−−−
⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ += s
s
s
s
m
s
s
N tHtHtH  for +ℜ∈s  
 
Depending on the values of  s  natives and immigrants could be complimentary or substitute 
or independent to each other in the labor market. Other things being the same, when 1=s , 
immigrants and natives are independent while when 1<s , they are substitutes. 
 
The technology of final goods uses skilled labor, and a set of intermediate goods to produce 
final goods and services for consumption.  
 
(8)  djtxtHtY
tA
jHYH
H∫−=
)(
0
,
1 ))(()()( αα   [ ])(,0 tAj H∈∀  
 
The number of intermediaries responds to profits associated to the production of 
intermediaries. It is assumed that additional unit number of intermediate goods requires 
skilled labor )(tH x  of )(
1
tAHθ  units. Thus, the endogenously growing technical changes are 
given by, 
 
 (9)  )()()( tHtAtA xHH θ=&  
 
Moreover, fixed supply of skilled workers at a point of time requires that the sum of skilled 
labor engaged in the production of final goods and ideas satisfies, 
 
 (10)  )()()( tHtHtH xY +≥  
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Definition 3: Equilibrium in production occurs when { }{ }∞
== 00,
)(),(),(
t
A
jjHYH
HtxtHtA  satisfies 
the problem { } djtxtHtwdjtxtH
tA
jHjYH
tA
jHY
xH
HH
HA
jHY
∫∫ −−−
=
)(
0
,
)(
0
,
1
,
)()()())(()(max
0
ϕαα   and 
{ }{ }∞
== 00,
)(
t
A
jjH
Htx satisfies the problem jHjHjx xxjH ,,,
max −ϕ  given the demand constraint from final 
goods sector. 
 
Each firm producing final goods chooses the quantity of labor and intermediaries used in 
production of final goods for a given wage of skilled workers and price of intermediaries.  
 
(11)  djtxtHtw
tA
jHYH
H∫−−=
)(
0
, ))(()()1()(
ααα  [ ])(,0 tAj H∈∀  and )1,0(∈α  
 
Equation (11) shows both the static and the dynamic effects of immigration. Noting 
that )()()()(
111
tHtHtHtH x
s
s
s
s
m
s
s
N
Y −⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ += −
−−
, for a given set of intermediate goods, wage is 
decreasing in the number of skilled migrants. The evidence for such a static effect is ample in 
the literature. For instance Borjas (2005) reported that for every 1% increase in the supply of 
immigrant skilled workers in the US, earnings decrease by 0.3%. Thus, in the extreme case 
where immigrants are perfect substitutes, in short run skilled migrants may crowd out natives 
in the labor market. 
  
On the other hand, equation (11) also implies that immigrants may have a differing effect on 
the market wage depending on their effect on the size and the number of intermediaries. For 
instance, Mideksa (2007) argues that migrants raise the number of intermediaries as the 
market for intermediate goods used in final goods is greater and monopolists have greater 
incentive to innovate new intermediaries. This effect is also illustrated in equation (12). The 
price of a specific intermediate good is increasing in the amount of total labor that 
compliments the intermediate good in the production of final goods and services.  
 
(12)  1,
1 )()()( −−= αααϕ txtHt jHYj  [ ])(,0 tAj H∈∀  
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Equation (12) shows that the price of intermediate goods is increasing in the number of 
migrants and decreasing in the supply of a given intermediate good.  
 
Proposition 4: At equilibrium, the price of intermediate goods is a constant which is the ratio 
of marginal cost to one minus the share of labor in the production of final goods. The wage of 
skilled workers is proportional to the total number of intermediate goods produced and the 
profit of each intermediate good producer is increasing in the volume of immigrants. 
 
Proof: 
Firms in the intermediate goods sector maximize profit from the production of intermediate 
goods. The production of each intermediate goods requires τ  units of intermediate good. 
Maximizing profit subject to the demand constraint imposed by final goods sector (12), the 
price of each intermediary is given by 
 
(13)  α
τϕ =)(tj . 
 
The right hand side of equation (13) is constant and it implies that each intermediate good 
faces the same price regardless of its type. That is ϕϕ =)(tj  which amounts to marginal cost 
over one minus the share of labor in the final output. 
 
Substituting (13) into (12), using the fact )()()()()(
111
tHtHtHtHtH x
s
s
s
s
m
s
s
N
Y −⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ +== −
−−
, 
and rearranging, results in equation (14).  The demand for each intermediate is increasing in 
the number immigrant skilled workers and decreasing in the marginal cost of producing 
additional unit of a given intermediary. 
 
(14)  
⎟⎟
⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜⎜
⎜
⎝
⎛
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Moreover, using equation (13) and (14), the profit from each intermediate good is given by, 
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The profit from each type of intermediate good is increasing in the total number of workers 
engaged in the production of final goods and services and decreasing with the number of 
skilled workers engaged in the production of new intermediate goods and marginal cost of 
producing the intermediate good.  The fact that higher rate of skilled immigrants entails 
greater profit implies that there is greater incentive for innovators to produce new innovations. 
Hence, the number of intermediate goods in the presence of skilled migrants is greater than 
the number of intermediate goods in the absence of skilled migrants. 
 
Using equations (11) and (14), it is easy to identify the dynamic effect of immigration on the 
average wage of skilled workers. The wage of skilled workers is increasing in the number of 
intermediate goods and decreasing in the marginal cost of intermediate good. 
 
(16)  )()1()(
12
tAtw HH
α
α
τ
αα −⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛−=  
 
Given the fact that more immigration involves greater number of intermediate goods, over the 
long run, greater supply of immigrants raise the wage of skilled labor in contrast to the static 
effect emphasised in equation (11). Over the long run, the static effect of increase in the 
supply of skilled labor is cancelled by increased demand for labor due to higher demand for 
the existing intermediate goods. In addition to raising the demand for the existing 
intermediate goods, immigration raises also the incentive for innovating new technologies and 
hence the number of intermediaries. QED. 
 
Proposition 5: Growth rate is increasing in the volume of immigrants regardless of the 
amount of physical capital immigrants posses. Moreover, higher volume of immigration 
raises the stock of capital in the economy by raising the interest rate. 
 
Proof: 
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Free entry into the business of innovation provides the mechanism to allocate skilled workers 
into the innovation of new intermediate goods and the production of final goods.  Each labor 
engaged in the business of innovation gets the discounted value of profit
r
t)(π . On the other 
hand, the opportunity cost of each unit of labor engaged in innovation is
)(
)(
tA
tw
H
H
θ . At 
equilibrium, the optimal amount of labor engaged in innovation is given by   
 
(17)  θα
rtHtHtH
s
s
s
s
m
s
s
N
X −⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ += −
−− 111
)()()( . 
 
Since the number of intermediate goods is increasing in the number of skilled workers 
engaged in research, (9), and the number of skilled workers engaged in research is increasing 
in skilled immigrants, immigrants raise the number of intermediate goods available in the 
economy. 
 
(18)  αθ
rtHgtg
HA
−== )()(  
 
The number of intermediate inputs is increasing in the number of total skilled workers and 
one minus the share of labor in the production function and decreasing in the rate of discount. 
Each consumer in chose consumption plans subject to the intertemporal budget constraint and 
non-Ponzi game condition. As shown elsewhere, for a constant relative risk aversion utility 
function, the optimal consumption path satisfies the equation, 
 
(19)   υ
ρ−== rg
tc
tc
)(
)(&   
 
Where ρ the subjective discount is rate and υ  is the relative rate of risk aversion. The 
equilibrium rate of growth is obtained by solving (18) and (19).  By using the two equations, 
the equilibrium rate of economic growth given as, 
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As can be seen from (20), growth is increasing in the number of skilled immigrants. The 
graph below, which is drawn based on the assumption of perfect substitution, indicates the 
effect on growth of increase in the rate of skilled immigration. Thus, the rate of growth would 
be permanently higher for a higher but also permanent rate of skilled immigration. QED 
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Figure 4: Volume of Skilled Immigration and Economic Growth 
 
Proposition 6: The inflow of migrants raises the proportion of natives that accumulate skill 
over the long run. 
 
Proof: 
As discussed previously, higher supply of skilled migrants reduce wage in the short run but 
raise wage in the long run and the number of intermediate goods produced by providing 
greater supply of skilled for innovation and greater market for each intermediate goods 
complimenting labor in the production of final goods and services. Since the supply of 
immigrants affect the return to investments in skill in the North, potentially immigration has 
another effect through skilled wage premium.  
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Individuals decide whether to accumulate skill, for our case join college and universities, or 
not to accumulate skill based on the relative present values of earnings, and cost of 
accumulating skill. Let )(tH N  be the number of workers that choose to accumulate skill as 
before and )(tL  be the number unskilled workers with any form of skill which associated 
with unskilled workers. Suppose there is a technology that uses unskilled workers to produce 
another set of final goods, )(tYL at time ""t .  The output produced by unskilled workers is 
given by, 
 
(21)  α−= 1)()( tmLtYL   +ℜ∈m . 
 
Firms producing )(tYL  face a wage of )(twL  and the quantity of labor they hire is given by 
equation (22). Like the standard demand for labor, demand for unskilled workers is 
decreasing in wage and increasing in labor productivity, m  and the share of labor in 
output )1( α− . 
 
(22)  α−= )()( tmLtwL  
 
Suppose that education increases productivity and hence wage. Thus, the wage of skilled 
workers is greater than the wage of unskilled workers in the economy. 
 
(23)   )()( LwHw N >  
 
However, skill is scarce resource that can only acquired by incurring costs. The cost of 
education ),( baC i  depends up on college feesb , and the exogenously given ability ia of 
individuals. 
 
(24)  bacbaC ii += )(),(  
 
Without loss of generality, let the cost function satisfies the properties 
of 0)(' <iac , 0)('' >iac , ),(~ 2aai Na σμ , ∞=→ )('0 ia aciml i , and 0)(' =∞→ ia aciml i . Suppose also 
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the endowment of ability of individuals follows some density function whose cumulative 
distribution is given by )(•Φ . Moreover, assume that )()(1 •=•− hc . Let the population in the 
north grows exogenously at a rate of n and its evolution is given by, 
 
(25)   nteNtN 0)( =  
 
The decision to accumulate skill is determined by its relative earning and cost of acquiring 
skill. If an individual, in North, is skilled it gets present value of wage for skilled 
workers ∫∞ −
0
)( dtHwe Nrt , and ∫∞ −
0
)( dtLwe rt  if she decides not to accumulate skill. Accumulation 
of skill costs every individual a constant cost, b  and a component that is decreasing with 
innate ability and assumed to be distributed according to some density function.  
When [ ] ),()()(
0
baCdtLwHwe i
Nrt >−∫∞ − , an individual with ability ia  chooses to accumulate 
skill and vice versa. 
 
At equilibrium, there will be a threshold of ability, *ia  at which all individuals with ability 
below which decide not to accumulate skill. It is given by 
 
(26)  ( ) [ ] ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −−= ∫∞ − bdtLwHwehbrLwHwa NrtNNi
0
)()(,),(),(* . 
 
Equation (26) implies that the threshold ability is increasing in r , wage of unskilled labor, and 
cost of schooling and decreasing in the wage of skilled labor and the excess wage of skilled 
labor. Equation (26) also provides the equation of skilled and unskilled workers for a given 
cumulative density of ability, )( iaΦ  with the usual properties of any cumulative density 
function. The number of natives who choose to accumulate skill and decline to accumulate 
skill are in the North are given by, 
 
(27)  nti
N eNatH 0*))(1()( Φ−=  
 
(28)  nti eNatL 0*)()( Φ=  
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As equation (27) makes it clear, the share of individuals that choose to accumulate skill is a 
decreasing function of threshold ability. The threshold ability in turn is decreasing in wage of 
skilled workers.  
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Equation (29) or alternatively from (16) and (20), it is shown that skilled immigrants raise the 
wage of skilled workers in the north. Hence, skilled immigrants also raise the proportion of 
individuals in the north who choose to accumulate skill by raising the incentive to accumulate 
skill. QED 
 
Conclusion 
The impact of immigrants on the welfare of natives has been a center of discussion. There has 
also been fierce discussion on various Mass Medias and huge rallies. Unlike the frequent 
allegations that immigrants hurt natives, the result from endogenous technical change implies 
that the inflow skilled immigration has overwhelmingly positive gains for the natives in the 
host nations in the areas of wage, technical change, long run growth, and human capital 
formation.  
 
First, the profit from intermediate goods positively depends on the quantity of labor 
complimenting intermediate goods in the production of final consumption good. Higher 
volume of immigrants raises the profit of each intermediate good producer and provides 
greater incentive to innovators to innovate new intermediate goods thereby raising the number 
of intermediate goods.  
 
Although there is some short run decrease in wage, as the rest of the economy responds to the 
inflow of skilled immigrants, over the long run the dynamic gains from skilled immigrants 
raises the productivity through directed technical change which responds to factor abundance. 
Since long run wage is proportional to technical change, inflow of immigrants raises the long 
run average wage unlike the implication of exogenous technical change.  
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The growing wage for skilled workers raises the wage differential between skilled and 
unskilled workers. As the return to skill increases, more individuals decide to accumulate skill 
than otherwise in the absence of such increase.  
 
Change in technology also affects the welfare of citizens, in addition to wage, as it is the 
source of the single most important variable over the long run-economic growth. Finally, 
although this paper has abstracted from capital stock and fiscal policy, there is an important 
implication for capital stock, fiscal policy, and level of income. The higher profit associated 
with skilled immigration has an important consequence for capital formation as capitalists 
respond to greater rate of return from investment, higher volume of immigration raises the 
capital stock and hence the level of income in the host economy. 
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Appendices 
A-1: Graphs 
Figure 1: The Skilled wage premiums of College and High-school graduates in 1967 – 
199010  
 
 
 
Figure 2: Immigrants to USA from SSA, SASIA, EASIA, and Latin America11 
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Figure 3: The Proportion of High School Graduates that are enrolled in colleges (1960 -1998) 
 
 
                                                 
‡ The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and does not represent the view of CICERO.  I am 
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1 The issue has been on the center of academic discussion, for instance beginning from the publication of the 
first issue of Journal of Development Economics.  It has also attracted the attention of politicians in many 
countries. It is widely believed that immigration issue has affected the 2001 election in Denmark and raised huge 
support for virulent anti-immigration parties such as National Alliance-Italy, National Front – France, and the 
Republikaner – Germany. Immigration has also been center of debate in the US economic policy. 
 
2 For instance Lalonde and Topel (1997) provide a considerable survey of the research on the issue.  
 
3 Borjas (1989), and Friedberg and Hunt (1995) also discuss the impact of immigrants on the wellbeing of 
receiving country. 
 
4 Beine et al. (2001), Chau and Stark  (1999), Davenport (2004), Docquier and Rapoport (2003),  Hemmi (2005), 
Lien (2006), Stark (2004), Stark et al. (1997) and Stark et al. (1998) 
 
5 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Immigration 
 
6 Table-1 is reproduced from Lalonde and Topel (1997) 
 
7 http://www.opinionjournal.com/extra/?id=110009535 
 
8 http://www.allcountries.org/uscensus/295_college_enrollment_of_high_school_graduates.html#2 
 
9 Mehlum, Moene, and Trovik (2006) show that equilibrium )1,0(∈θ . 
10 Reproduced from Hecker(1992) 
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11 Reproduced from Collier, Hoeffler, & Pattillo (2004) 
